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1. MODEL OF FALSE-NAME BIDS
Although the Internet provides an excellent infrastructure for executing combina-
torial auctions, we must consider the possibility of new types of cheating. For
example, a bidder may try to profit from submitting false bids under fictitious
names such as multiple e-mail addresses. Such an action is very difficult to detect
since identifying each participant on the Internet is virtually impossible. We call a
bid made under a fictitious name a false-name bid.
False-name bids are modeled as follows.
—Each bidder can use multiple identifiers.
—Each identifiers is unique and cannot be impersonated, i.e., a bidder cannot use
identifiers that belong to other bidders.
—Nobody (except the owner) knows whether two identifiers belongs to the same
bidder or not.
The goal is to design a false-name-proof mechanism, i.e., a mechanism in which
using false names is useless, thus bidders voluntary refrain from using false names.
The problems resulting from collusion have been discussed by many researchers.
Compared to collusion, a false-name bid is easier to execute on the Internet since
getting another identifier such as another e-mail address, is quite inexpensive. False-
name bids can be considered as a very restricted subclass of collusion, where bidder
i can collude with other bidders only if these bidders are not interested in partici-
pating the auction initially. Theses bidders act in behalf of bidder i and get some
side payment.
A concept called group-strategy-proof is proposed to study another restricted
subclass of general collusion [Muller and Satterthwaite 1985; Moulin and Shenker
1996]. Group-strategy-proof and false-name-proof are independent concepts, i.e., a
group-strategy-proof mechanism is not necessarily false-name-proof, and vice versa.
2. VULNERABILITY OF VCG
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (a.k.a. Generalized Vickrey Auction protocol)
is (dominant strategy) incentive compatible, i.e., for each bidder, truth-telling is a
dominant strategy (a best strategy regardless of the action of other bidders) if there
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exists no false-name bid. However, when false-name bids are possible, truth-telling
is no longer a dominant strategy, i.e., the VCG is not false-name-proof.
Let us consider the following situation.
Example 2.1. Assume there are two goods a and b, and three bidders, bidder 1,
2, and 3. The evaluation value for a bundle is determined as follows.
{a} {b} {a, b}
bidder 1 $6 $0 $6
bidder 2 $0 $0 $8
bidder 3 $0 $5 $5
By using the VCG, good a is allocated to bidder 1, and b is allocated to bidder 3.
Bidder 1 pays $3 and bidder 3 pays $2.
Let us consider another situation.
Example 2.2. Assume there are only two bidders, bidder 1 and 2. The evalua-
tion value for a bundle is determined as follows.
{a} {b} {a, b}
bidder 1 $6 $5 $11
bidder 2 $0 $0 $8
In this case, the bidder 1 can obtains both goods, but he/she requires to pay $8,
since if bidder 1 does not participate, the social surplus would have been $8. When
bidder 1 does participate, bidder 1 takes everything and the social surplus except
bidder 1 becomes 0. Thus, bidder 1 needs to pay the decreased amount of the social
surplus, i.e., $8.
However, bidder 1 can use another identifier, namely, bidder 3 and creates a
situation identical to Example 2.1. Then, good a is allocated to bidder 1, and b
is allocated to bidder 3. Bidder 1 pays $3 and bidder 3 pays $2. Since bidder 3
is a false-name of bidder 1, bidder 1 can obtain both goods by paying $3+$2=$5.
Thus, using a false-name is profitable for bidder 1.
3. KEY RESULTS
The effects of false-name bids on combinatorial auctions are analyzed in [Yokoo
et al. 2004]. The obtained results can be summarized as follows.
—As shown in the above example, the VCG is is not false-name-proof.
—There exists no false-name-proof combinatorial auction protocol that satisfies
Pareto efficiency.
—If a surplus function of bidders satisfies a condition called concavity, then the
VCG is guaranteed to be false-name-proof.
Also, a series of mechanisms that are false-name-proof in various settings have
been developed: combinatorial auction mechanisms [Yokoo et al. 2001a; Yokoo
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2003], multi-unit auction mechanisms [Iwasaki et al. 2005; Terada and Yokoo 2003;
Yokoo et al. 2001b], double auction mechanisms [Sakurai and Yokoo 2002; 2003;
Yokoo et al. 2005], and combinatorial procurement auctions [Suyama and Yokoo
2005].
An auction mechanism consists of an allocation rule and a payment rule. There
have been several studies on characterizing strategy-proof allocation rules. Lavi et
al. [Lavi et al. 2003] and Bikhchandani et al. [Bikhchandani et al. 2006] proposed
weak-monotonicity and showed that it is a necessary and sufficient condition for
strategy-proof mechanisms when several assumptions hold on the domain of types.
Similarly, we showed that if (and only if) an allocation rule satisfies a condition
called sub-additivity, we can guarantee that there exists an appropriate payment
rule so that the mechanism becomes false-name-proof, i.e., sub-additivity fully char-
acterizes false-name-proof allocation rules [Todo et al. 2009]. Also, we examined a
theoretical bound on the efficiency loss of false-name-proof mechanisms and devel-
oped a mechanism whose worst-case efficiency loss matches the theoretical bound
[Iwasaki et al. 2010].
In [Ausubel and Milgrom 2005], several limitations of the VCG including the
vulnerability to false-name bids are discussed. Also, in [Rastegari et al. 2007],
the connection between false-name-proofness and another property called revenue
monotonicity is discussed.
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